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somment compte des particularités psychologiques et physiologiques de la femmes? La 
femme est-elle considérée comme du travail à bon marché ? 
Banquet de clôture: 
La femme dans le monde du travail d'aujourd'hui 
Mme Pierrette Sartm 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS 
H. D. WOODS 
In December 1966, Prime Minister Pearson announced the création of a 
Task Force on Labour Relations. Under the chairmanship of H.D. Woods, 
Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science, McGill Universiry, Montréal, the meimbers 
are: Gérard Dion, Professor, Department of Industrial Relations, Laval Uni-
versiry, Québec; John H.G. Crispo, Director, Centre for Industrial Relations, 
Universiry of Toronto; A.W.R. Carrothers, Dean, Faculty of Law, Universiry 
of Western Ontario. 
The announcement late in 1966 that a Task Force concerned with the problems of 
labour-management relations was being established by the Government of Canada raises 
questions of great interest and considérable importance. Probably the most important 
question concerns the reasons for setting up an investigation at this particular point of 
time. A second matter concerns the character of a Task Force and how i t differs from, 
for example, the more familiar royal commission. Closely related to this question is why 
this device, new in Canadian expérience, should be the instrument chosen to deal with 
the labour-management relations problem. A fourth matter of interest is the modus operandi 
of the Task Force itself. Thèse are basic questions and there are many more of considérable 
importance which might be listed. But the four I hâve mentioned: 1) why an investigation?; 
2) the character of a Task Force; 3) why this form is chosen; 4) and how it will work; 
give us ample opportunity to look at the problem and try to place this whole complicated 
business of labour-management relations into some meaningful perspective. 
The Need for an investigation at Présent 
I suspect most Canadians would confess to some degree of puzzlement concerning 
labour-management relations in the years 1965, 66 and 67. This country has been exper-
iencing one of the heaviest periods of strike activity in its history. After the industrial 
turbulence of 1946, associated with the post war readjustment, the curve of strike action 
was generally downward. The labour force was gradually expanding because of the retum 
to civil life of three quarters of a million service personnel, because of heavy immigration 
in the late forties and the décade of the fifties, and because of the appearance on the 
labour market during the late fifties and the sixties of large numbers associated with the 
population bulge related to the increased birth rate of the forties. During the same period 
unionization was increasing in total numbers, although some unions were more or less 
stable in numbers or were even declining. 
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One might hâve expected that the number of strikes, the man days lost during strikes, 
and the gênerai manifestations of industrial unrest would hâve grown with the labour 
force and with unionization. The statistics prove otherwise and this country experienced 
a graduai décline of the use and the impact of the strike weapon. With ups and downs we 
had about eighteen years of apparent improvement in industrial relationships in this country. 
While there were expressions of dissatisfaction by labour and management and some members 
of the public with public policies, thèse rarely reached the level of véhémence which 
prompted the introduction of really important changes in either public attitudes or public 
policies in industrial relations. There were exceptions. The railway strike in 1950 produced 
the first major experiment in legislating the termination of an industrial conflict and the 
imposition of machinery of settlement in a situation normally left to private negotiation. 
The Brandon Packers strike in Manitoba led to an enquiry under Judge Tritchler and to 
changes in the labour law of that province and the introduction of the légal entity provision 
regarding unions and government supervision of strike votes. Similarly the Government of 
Newfoundland intervened in a Woodworkers' strike and legislated the unions bargaining 
rights out of existence. 
There are other examples of législative changes of thèse ad hoc types, and there 
has been a graduai évolution of public policy and law based on expérience of the parties 
cf interest, labour and management, and of agencies of public policy such as conciliation 
officers and boards, labour relations boards and the like. But because of relative industrial 
peace there seemed to be no need for any thorough examination in depth of the labour* 
relations problem in Canada, nor has there been one. 
In 1965 we entered a period of heightened industrial conflict culminating in work 
stoppages. This continued through 1966 and promises to be with us in 1967. While the 
governments of several provinces, and especially Québec, hâve been drawn into thèse 
conflicts, the burden on the Fédéral Government has been particularly heavy because of 
the high incidence of industrial unrest and strikes in industries and occupations falling 
within the Fédéral jurisdiction. One has only to take a superficial look at the S.I.U. problem, 
the railway and airline disputes, the postal strike and a few others to realize that the 
Fédéral Government has been caught up in a baffling and complex set of labour-manage-
ment problems. It is therefore not surprising that the time would corne when the sensible 
thing seemed to be the initiating of an investigation whose object would be to analyse 
the problems in industrial relations to see to what extent public policies were appropriate 
to deal with the issues now before us. I personally know only that the Government had 
decided on such an investigation and that I was invited to be the chairman, but from my 
conversations with government officiais I gathered that they believed very strongly that 
an objective examination largely under the direction of professional students of industrial 
relations was needed. I believe it is the Ottawa view that an examination of industrial 
relations and of the rôle of government would be done better if persons in those Canadian 
universities which over the years had been developing industrial relations centres and 
departments were involved to an important degree. I personally agrée that an examination 
in depth was called for. Otherwise I would not hâve accepted the appointaient as chairman. 
The Character of the Task Force 
The Task Force concept is, like so much Canadianna, borrowed from the United States. 
I believe it originated with the late Président Kennedy. It is a body established to assist 
the government in understanding difficult and complexing problems; problems whose 
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solutions seem to hâve outgrown the range or capacity normally to be expected from the 
existing appropriate Departmental staff in the Civil Service, problems for which there appear 
to be no solutions acceptable within the established framework of public policy and 
administration. 
There is no fixed model for a task force and it may be designed in a variety of ways. 
It differs from a royal commission, the instrument which has normally been used in Canadian 
socio-pathological situations, in that it combines persons from outside the public services 
with persons within. In the présent instance, for example, the four of us from the universities 
will hâve associated with us an upper level officiai from each of the Departments of Man-
power, Labour, Finance, Industry, and probably from the Bureau of Statistics. This ensures 
a close liaison between the work of the Task Force and the knowledge, expertise, services 
and ideas within the established departments of government. Such interdependent links 
are possible with this device. We are also to hâve a labour-management consultative 
committee with which we will be in regular contact by means of conférences and the 
distribution of working papers and research reports. 
Why the Task Force in the Présent Situation 
The choice of a Task Force was mode by the government and I can then only speculate 
on the reasons behind this décision. Some of them appear to be obvious from the remarks 
I hâve made about the concept of a Task Force and the composition of this parlicular one. 
There is the great advantage of combining the parties of interest, the appropriate government 
departments, and university personnel. This should give those of us with the major respon-
sibility, the university group, ready and continuing access to the ideas and the vast 
expérience of labour and management on the one hand and the information and research 
facilities available in government departments. 
Secondly, the Task Force is flexible, both as to structure and method. We may, with 
expérience, décide that some adjustment to our organization is called for. A simple adminis-
trative décision can effect the change. Our procédures will be determined by the views we 
hold of the task itself, and by the criticism and advice we receive from the consultative 
body and the departmental représentatives. 
Thirdly, by this device we will be able to work quickly and economically. For example, 
there is always going on in Ottawa a very considérable volume of research to meet the 
needs of existing policy and administration. Through the departmental représentatives this 
will be better known to us, and with perhaps slight adjustment of program can be of great 
value to us. Légal studies in the Labour Department, Labour Force participation studies in 
the Bureau of Statistics, and others are important to us. In consultation with officiais, 
the results of on-going research, sometimes with slight modification, can become part of 
our data. Moreover, thèse Departments with représentatives on the Task Force will 
undoubtedly ensure that our requests for help will be met. This association will also mean 
that there will be a fairly continuous flow of communication to as well as from the govern-
ment departments. This will be through meeting, working papers, research reports and the 
liUe. A very considérable number of persons important in the design of policy and 
administrative changes will be involved from the beginning, and more or less continuously. 
Consequently, what ultimately émerges will be understood and appreciated by them as 
participants in the procédures used. Labour and management members of the consultative 
body will hâve a clearer understanding for the same reason. 
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How the Task Force Will Work 
I corne now to the heart of the problem. How will the Task Force go about its work. 
The answer is implicit and even partly explicit in what has already been said. We must 
start with the problem itself. A digression into the nature of industrial relations and public 
policy is necessary. 
Industrial relations problems arise in an économie society like that existing in Canada 
because of employment and the labour contract System; and because in the very nature 
of the responsibilities of management, authority must be exercised over those who accept 
employment. A prominent characteristic of industrialism is the extent to which we hâve 
carried the principle of division of labour or spécialization. From this hâve arisen great 
gains in productivity per worker and a high standard of income relative to that achieved 
in économies which practise spécial ization to a lesser degree. But with each advance in 
the division of labour has corne an increased importance of the principle of coopération, 
and it is a task of management to make the décisions, formulate the plans, and exercise 
the authority necessary to ensure that effective coopération does in fact prevail. Management 
efforts are, or should be, directed toward the économie success of the enterprise. Individuals 
in management hâve, of course, their own personal goals, and in this respect are employées; 
but as functioning managers they are institutionally oriented. The labourer who works for 
hire does so to acquire an income for himself and for whatever other personal reasons which 
may move him to do so. Personally he has no responsibility to the organization other than 
to provide his labour. 
Clearly the goals of management and of labour conflict in at least two important 
areas. The attempt to achieve efficiency as conceived by management means a continuous 
stream of décisions in an ever changing situation, many of which will hâve an effect on 
employées, some to their advantage and some to their disadvantage. The worker who is 
by-passed for a promotion he believed should hâve çome to him has a sensé of grievance 
against management regardless of whether or not the net effect is higher efficiency. The 
labourer who is laid-off because of a décline in sales of the product he has been helping 
to manufacture, the altération of production processes, or the introduction of a new 
machine, may face a personal disaster, and so on. Thus the exercise of décisions under the 
authority of management reveals a first major area of conflicts of interest. 
The second area is the more obvious one concerning the division of the product of 
industry as between wages and other labour income on the one hand and the other dis-
tribuée shares such as executive salaries and profits on the other. Who gets what out of 
the product of industry ? 
Canada, like other western-style countries has relied very heavily on the labour 
market to settle thèse industrial relations issues. The employée is usually legally free to 
terminate his labour contract if he objects to the conditions of work and the employer is 
usually considered legally free to demote or dismiss an employée for whatever reason he 
likes. Over the course of time, after a long period during which serious légal obstacles 
I do not hâve time to discuss today had to be overcome, workmen developed the unions 
as countervailing power centres to the power management derived from control over capital 
supplies and therefore jobs. In a sensé the basic effort of unionism could be thought of as 
an attempt to weaken the job control of management. This movement has resulted in a vast 
complex of unions and union fédérations with a multiplicity of forms and constitutions and 
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Systems of government and modes of negotiation with management. Just as the structure 
of a corporation and the administrative variations it develops will tend to reflect the nature 
of the économie opération it is established to perform, so unions tend to develop in accord-
ance with the nature of the problems confronting those the unions represent. Likewise the 
relationship that émerges between management and unions will take on a coloration from the 
personnel problems and interests in the vorious occupations in différent industries. 
Industrial relations are power relations. Basically in our society we hâve been inclined 
to rely on market factors to keep the power conflict wîthin limits considered tolerable by the 
public at large. On the management side — is the power to order, direct, discipline individ-
ually or collectively, and discharge — not inconsiderable power to induce employées to 
accept management décisions. On the employée side is the power derived from quitting and 
the much greater power flowing from the damage that may corne from such collective 
actions as the slow-down, the work to rule, and the strike. 
Public policy regarding industrial relations has gone through a long period of évolution 
until the présent when it supports the right of individuels to join and work for the goals of 
unions, and imposes collective bargaining on employées at the request of a majority of the 
employées involved. Labour relations Acts in the Fédéral and Provincial jurisdiction ail 
accept this principle of compulsory collective bargaining. Enforcement has required the 
estabishment of labour agencies concerned with the relationship, especiatly labour relations 
Boards. 
But public policy is also concerned with industrial peace, hence a premium is placed on 
collective bargaining which reaches a resolution of the issues in dispute without a resort to 
work stoppages. At least since the opening of the twentieth century the Government of 
Canada has assumed a rôle in industrial peace-making. Conciliation officers and later 
conciliation Boards hâve been made available to assist the parties of interest to reach 
agreements. Indeed, since 1907 in public service situations fédéral policy has involved the 
imposition of the services of conciliation boards or parties, along with a statutory restraint 
on the use of the work stoppage until the conciliation stages hâve been completed. During 
the second world war and after this combination of légal restraint on the resort to économie 
force and state intervention via conciliation became practically universal in Canada. In 
récent years there has been some érosion of this System and even abandonment of compul-
sory boards in some jurisdictions. 
Government is concerned with industrial relations in several additional respects. Until 
fairly récent years public policy in Canada as well as the United States and some other 
Western Countries has operated on the implicit assumption that the public had little 
cr no concern with the économie effects of collective bargaining. It was fairly widely held 
that the parties of interest would make bargains which would not be disturbing to the 
public, and that the cost to the respective bargaining parties would discourage prolonged 
work stoppages. But the assumption by Western governments of responsibilities te ensure 
something approximoting to full employment has tended to create conditions favourable to 
price inflation including the price of labour, wages. Governments hâve become concerned 
with the possible effect of collective bargaining on the movement of prices in the economy. 
During wartime emergencies économie controls in support of économie stability were 
imposed. Wage and price ceilings and even rationing were common. But in peacetime thèse 
déviées hâve been abandoned. But the spreading rôle of government économie planning, 
and the use of fiscal and monetary weapons to achieve goals such as price stability has 
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tempted officialdom to engage in tampering with labour market forces. Guidelines in the 
USA. and the wage freeze in the U.K. are illustrations of a growing belief that free 
collective bargaining may produce anti-social results. 
Still another area of government concern has become much more important in récent 
years, namely the continuity of supply of services considered to be essential to the public. 
Police and fire services hâve long been prohibited areas for strikes, but government has 
intervened increasingly sometimes with ad hoc législation to prevent strikes or to bring 
existing strikes to an end. On several occasions since 1950 arbitration has been imposed 
on the railways by parliament, hydro in Ontario has had the some treatment, the postal 
strike was handled in somewhat the same way, and there are other examples of the apparent 
breakdown of the process of accommodation to the point where public authorities, whether 
provincial or fédéral, hâve concluded that the limit of public tolérance had been reached. 
Finally, the Government of Canada, and indeed provincial governments as well, hâve 
become direct participants in industrial relations issues where the government is itself in 
the rôle of the employer. The vast expansion of government services has resulted in a very 
large segment of the labour force being government employées. In récent years unionism 
has spread rapidly in the public services and, under pressure from the labour movement, 
rights to bargain and even to strike hâve been accorded in some jurisdictions. Thus a whole 
new area of institutionalized industrial relationships is being developed. 
The members of me Task Force believe it to be their responsibility to try to get a 
better understanding of the forces of influence in industrial relations. To do so requires a 
séries of investigations in considérable depth into background influences as well as a study 
of expérience. We propose to examine the main threads of économie and social évolution 
for the last few décades, to study the history of labour force changes for a couple of 
census periods, to look at the history of unionism and to try to understand and interpret 
the changing philosophy of the labour movement as well as of management since the 1930's. 
We propose to examine the structure of both unionism and management organisations, and 
of the relations between them. We will study the history of public policy and labour légis-
lation regarding such matters as certification, bargaining units, conciliation, labour relations 
boards and their procédures, emergency disputes provisions, unfair labour practices, strikes, 
lockouts, slowdowns, the groups excluded from coverage of labour relations acts, and so on. 
An important spécial study will be made of the history of industrial unrest for a con-
sidérable period. We hope in this way to learn something about the periodicity of conflicts, 
the incidence of strikes, as well as the apparent lack of conflict in certain situations and 
régions. We propose a number of industry studies over time in which we will attempt 
to understand the industrial relationships in each important industry, especially but not 
exclusively in those under fédéral jurisdiction. 
In an attempt to increase our insight we propose to study éléments which hâve a 
bearing on behaviour such as the impact of twenty years of relative affluence and job 
security on worker attitudes toward income, unionism, and the strike. We will try to assess 
the real importance of industrial conversion or technological change. We will be concerned 
with changing attitudes toward law and the courts and civil disobedience. Nor can we 
ignore the American présence, the corporate links, international unionisms, and the wage 
differential as a bargaining target. Regionalism and cultural factors will also be reviewed 
in-so-far as they help to explain reationships in employment. 
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Foctors Internai to the Labour Movement 
We will be trying to understand the internai issues of unionism, the spécial problems 
of unionism as it spreads into areas such as white collar and professional occupations ; 
the problem of the apparent conflict between démocratie procédures and agreernent ratif-
ication and strike policies; the problem of union security and individual rights. Thèse are 
intra-union problems, but there are equally difficult inter-union conflicts. There is the 
rivalry between the C.L.C. and international unions on the one hand and the C.N.T.U. 
on the other, a conflict which seems to be spilling out of Québec into Ontario; there is 
the whole question of the structure of labour organizations and the locus of power as 
between locals and national offices, within fédérations and so on. It is surely significant 
that the Canadian Labour Congress is itself conducting an investigation of its own internai 
structural problems. 
Management also has been undergoing important changes and we propose to examine 
the rôle of the personnel function, job design, job satisfaction, bureaucratization of industry, 
the locus of décision making, and the rôle of employer and management associations. 
Foctors Internai to Labour-Management Relations 
It will be important, we believe, to examine the changing nature of collective bar-
gaining issues, inter-union relations at the bargaining table, short and long-term agreements ; 
the opération of grievance procédures and arbitration and experiments in labour-management 
coopération. We are concerned to know whether or not collective bargaining is being asked 
to solve new varieties of problems for which it is unsuited, or which call for major changes 
in the bargaining process itself. 
Factors Related to Législative and Non-législative Intervention 
There is a whole host of problems related to bargaining units and certification, the 
conciliation procédures and publically imposed arbitration of rights disputes. We will study 
the rôle of spécial mediators, industrial inquiry commissions, ad hoc ministerial intervention, 
the use of court orders and the like. 
Methods, Suggestions and Recommendations 
The list above is not exhaustive. Undoubtedly it will require a rather ambitious program 
of research. From it we hope to be in a position to assist the Government of Canada, the 
direct parties of interest, and the public generally to get a better understanding of the 
nature of industrial relationships in this country, to assess the soundness of current policies 
in the field and the effectiveness of the instruments of public intervention. 
We are taking the broad view that we are examining the industrial relations system 
rather thon merely the problem of industrial dispute seulement. And 1 think I can honestly 
say we hâve not prejudged the issues. 
